

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

TS# 185471

25X1

From

Rough Notes on Meeting of Rostow Committee, morning of 25 October

1. Rostow's report of this meeting to Bundy will make the following points:

a. The chief present danger is that our policy will lose momentum and the USSR will be able to retain its Cuban bases as a military threat and as a means of political leverage elsewhere.

b. The group suggested an extension of the quarantine to include POL as a means of maintaining momentum. This, it was further argued, would be a way to insure that time would, to some extent, act in our favor. It was suggested that a full POL blockade could be approached via an interim extension of the present quarantine list to include missiles fuels.

25X1

c. The group will prepare a paper to update Harvey's, forwarded yesterday, analyzing Soviet intentions and tactics; I am assigned to prepare the updated version for today's four o'clock meeting.

d. A paper will be prepared on the free world, containing a summary of reactions to date, an analysis of pressures to be

NSC review

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

expected, and recommendations for coping with these pressures.
This will be prepared in State.

e. The Navy is preparing a paper on rules of engagement for contingencies arising out of the quarantine.

f. State and USIA are preparing today a paper setting forth a supplementary argument for our doctrinal position on the difference between Soviet and Western bases.

Gleanings

2. The doctrinal supplement mentioned above will put the quarantine into the entire context of our moves against communism since northern Iran in 1946. CIA was requested to consider whether it has special means of disseminating this argument, in addition to normal USIA efforts.

3. Rostow stressed that the military (represented by General Turnage) must prepare a whole series of contingency plans geared to the various political constraints which the President may wish to impose. is supplying these constraints to the JCS, as well as various political objectives which might be sought in military action.

- 2 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

25X1

4. [] is pulling together a paper for Rusk to give the White House ^{our} on first moves in response to Summit pressures.

5. Rostow raised the problem of press guidance for the contingency in which the first test of the quarantine occurs with a nonmilitary cargo or even a passenger ship. His proposals for meeting this awkward situation were (a) to stress the danger that critical components of offensive systems could be concealed on any vessel; and (b) if we allow such ships to pass unchallenged and therefore establish a precedent, the Soviets may use such ships to carry critical components in the future.

a. There is general regret that a tanker halted this morning had been allowed to pass without boarding upon replying that its cargo was POL.

b. CIA might be able to assist in making the argument presented here.

c. This is, however, a contingency matter. We should not stress the possibility of critical components among nonmilitary cargo unless and until the US has decided to board and search all ships.

- 3 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

6. There was some discussion, generated by a last minute report of a five thousand men revolt in Camaguey Province, of the possibility of spontaneous resistance in Cuba. Rostow is greatly interested in the chance that something of this sort might happen as the Cubans observe the turning back of Soviet ships, frequent US overflights, and the passivity of Cuban air defenses. The group is interested in any kinds of US activity which might further improve these possibilities, and in the timing and context of such US moves.

- 4 -

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Page Denied